The EU can buy weapons and do more for Ukraine. But France's unrest shows how hard it will be to pay for a defense that relies less on America.

 

(Photo by Antoine Schibler on Unsplash)

The demonstrations across France on November 21 were smaller and largely peaceful. 

After weeks of unrest, that came as a relief. 

In October, protests over living costs and deteriorating public services spiraled into riots, and the historic city hall in Limoges was set ablaze. In November, a regional councilor was struck by a gasoline-filled bottle outside a high school in Chelles. The violence drew headlines, but the grievances outlasted them. 

French voters are asking what they get for the taxes they already pay. 

Their government also has to make the case for spending more on defense.

France helps explain why Timothy Garton Ash’s NYT call for Europe to “save itself” is easier to make than to carry out. 

France has nuclear weapons and a defense industry, but the European Commission expects its economy to grow just 0.4 percent this year. It projects French public debt will reach 123 percent of GDP by 2028. 

Germany has more room to borrow. That gives the two countries different stakes in decisions about who finances European rearmament and whose factories get the orders. Across the EU, 22 percent of residents are already 65 or older. Defense will compete with pensions, health care and public services for years.

Ukraine is where Europe’s record deserves the most scrutiny. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, EU member states had allowed Russia to supply about 45 percent of their gas imports. That dependence persisted after Moscow annexed Crimea in 2014. European gas purchases provided Moscow with revenue and gave it leverage when governments needed to respond to the invasion. The EU brought Russia’s share down to about 12 percent by 2025. That shows how much Europe can change under pressure, and how much it cost to wait until the pressure arrived.

The EU’s €90 billion support loan for Ukraine is significant. A November disbursement of €4.36 billion shows that money is moving. The process also exposed the limits of European unity. Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia opted out of backing the loan, and Hungary initially blocked a separate budget amendment. The other countries found a way through. That is evidence that willing governments can finance Ukraine even amid disagreement. Kyiv also needs weapons on time, and Europe still relies on American systems for some of what it supplies.

By the end of 2028, Europe will probably have made more progress financing Ukraine and buying weapons jointly than replacing the full U.S. military role. The spending is already rising. The European Defence Agency projects that EU members will spend €454 billion on defense this year, and the EU has set up a €150 billion loan program to support joint procurement. Shared orders can give manufacturers a reason to expand production and make it easier for European forces to use and maintain the same equipment.

Replacing American intelligence and strategic airlift will take longer. So will recruiting and training enough personnel to sustain larger forces. And a procurement agreement can leave the hardest question unanswered. In a crisis, which governments would commit their troops, and how quickly could they make that decision? Britain’s importance shows why the answer will have to extend beyond the EU. London and Brussels agreed this month to deepen cooperation on moving forces across Europe, a practical step that can make NATO’s European members more effective.

The American midterms give European leaders little reason to change course. 

A new Congress can shape spending, but it cannot tell Europe who will be in the White House in January 2029 or what that president will ask of allies. 

The next two years are more likely to produce a stronger European role inside NATO, with smaller groups of countries moving ahead where agreement among all 27 proves difficult. 

For France, the challenge is to sustain that effort while answering voters’ concerns at home. 

For Europe, the test by 2028 will be whether it can get money and equipment to Ukraine on time, keep factories producing, and move its own forces when they’re needed. Every one of those gains would give Europe more room to act, whoever Americans elect in 2028.

(Contributing writer, Brooke Bell)